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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Jeffrey Daniel Casad appeals following his conviction on two counts of felony 
injury to a child. Mr. Casad asserts that the district court erred when, over his objection, 
it allowed the State to present testimony and evidence that he expressed no interest in 
services for his children or seeing his children after they were taken from him because it 
was irrelevant, propensity evidence. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Jeffrey Daniel Casad was charged, by Indictment, with two counts of injury to 
children for purportedly "failing to provide proper nourishment and/or for environmental 
deprivation resulting in failure to thrive and/or developmental delays" with respect to two 
children for whom he had care or custody. (R., pp.9-10.) 
At a pretrial evidentiary hearing, the district court, over Mr. Casad's relevance 
and prejudice objections, ruled that the State could present evidence of his "refusal of 
services and refusal to visit the children" after they were taken as a result of the conduct 
for which he was being prosecuted. (Tr., p.62, Ls.6-23; R., pp.120-22.) During the 
course of the trial, the State presented evidence that included numerous statements 
attributed to Mr. Casad indicating that, after the children were taken, he was not 
interested in regaining custody of his children, did not wish to visit them, and did not 
inquire about them. (Tr., p.244, Ls.10-23, p.320, L.11 - p.321, L.19; State's Exhibit No. 
40.) 
Following the presentation of the case to the jury, Mr. Casad was found guilty of 
both counts. (Tr., p.624, Ls.3-24.) Ultimately, he received consecutive sentences of ten 
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years, with two years fixed, for Count I and five years, with no fixed portion, for Count II, 
with of the sentences suspended in favor of a six-year term of probation. 
(Tr., p.683, L.25 - p.685, L.23.) 
Mr. Casad filed a timely Notice of Appeal. (R., p.225.) 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err when, over Mr. Casad's objection, it permitted the State to 
present irrelevant, propensity evidence? 
3 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When, Over Mr. Casad's Obiection, It Permitted The State To 
Present Irrelevant, Propensity Evidence 
At a pretrial evidentiary hearing, the district court, over Mr. Casad's relevance 
and prejudice objections, ruled that the State could present evidence of his "refusal of 
services and refusal to visit the children" after they were taken as a result of the conduct 
for which he was being prosecuted. (Tr., p.62, Ls.6-23; R., pp:120-22.) During the 
course of the trial, the State presented evidence that included numerous statements 
attributed to Mr. Casad indicating that, after the children were taken, he was not 
interested in regaining custody of his children, did not wish to visit them, and did not 
inquire about them. (Tr., p.244, Ls.10-23, p.320, L.11 p.321, L.1 · State's Exhibit No. 
40.) 
During its initial closing argument, the State argued, "But what does he respond 
in one of the jail calls? Well, it's not like they have lost anything physical when these 
kids were taken. It's not like he lost the car. Wasn't that, basically, what he tells law 
enforcement, as well? 'Take them. They can have them."' (Tr., p.586, Ls.2-7.) A few 
minutes later, the State argued, 
He never again inquired as to the children. Did you notice that the Health 
and Welfare worker told him that [D.C.] was hospitalized and wanted to 
give him information on failure to thrive? He knows what that is, because 
he knows everything. Never visited with the children. That was it. He 
was right. They took the children they can have them. 
(Tr., p.593, L.25 - p.594, L.7.) The State's final reference, in its initial closing argument, 
to Mr. Casad's disinterest in regaining his children after they were taken was to argue, 
"And he doesn't want the children returned." (Tr., p.591, Ls.23-24.) 
During the State's rebuttal closing argument, it argued, 
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And it's a crime when it's under these circumstances, and he did willfully 
do it 
You can tell that when you listen to the jail calls. You can tell that from -
when he talked to Health and Welfare, it was only the next day. And if he 
didn't really think anything was wrong with his children, why is he telling 
them the day that they're removed, "Take them. Just take them. I don't 
want them back." If he didn't think anything was wrong with them, why 
wouldn't he want them back? 
Health and Welfare would just be taking them down there, getting this 
checkup, and everything would be fine and dandy, and he could have his 
healthy kids back. He didn't want them back. He tells them that. 
(Tr. , p. 616, L. 1 6 p. 61 7, L. 7.) 
The district court concluded that the evidence that, after his children were taken, 
Mr. Casad was not interested in regaining custody of them, visiting them, or inquire 
about them, was not covered by Rule 404(b), concluding, "I think that's res justae [sic]." 
(Tr., p.21, L.23 - p.22, L.3.) The district court's initial reasoning in allowing evidence of 
Mr. Casad's attitude about his children after they were taken was as follows: 
The defendants'[1] refusal of services and refusal to visit the children, both 
defendants have argued that this is not relevant and that it paints an 
inaccurate picture, that it puts them in an untenable position of having to 
rebut that evidence with their story of what has happened in a prior State. 
I recognize that. I recognize that it's an untenable position, but that 
doesn't make the evidence itself irrelevant. The evidence of the 
defendants' refusal to participate in services, the refusal to visit the 
children in a fact finder's mind, may make an intent element more or less 
likely. And I don't think it's unfairly prejudicial. It puts the defendants in a 
difficult position, but that's different than prejudice. So that is admissible, 
and the State can introduce that in their case in chief. 
(Tr., p.62, Ls.6-23.) 
In reconsidering its earlier ruling, the district court explained, 
1 At the time of the district court's ruling, both Mr. Casad and the mother of the children 
were co-defendants facing a joint trial. (R., p.16.) Mr. Casad's co-defendant pied guilty 
before his trial. (Tr., p.481, Ls.2-10.) 
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I don't know that they are relevant to intent, necessarily. I believe that 
they are relevant to the or the failing to act portion of the 
burden of proof, which is to say that a fact finder could find that it is more 
likely that someone who has no interest in their children is more likely to 
act or failed to act where a reasonable person would otherwise act. 
So I don't think this is an intent ruling. I think it actually goes to the 
substance of the charge that the State is required to prove. But I believe 
it's relevant on that basis. So that is my ruling on that. 
(Tr., p.76, Ls.2-22.) 
The district court's reasoning, on reconsideration, was based entirely on the 
evidence's propensity value, with the district court concluding that the subsequent acts 
demonstrating disinterest in his children were admissible because they could cause a 
jury to believe that Mr. Casad had acted similarly at the time of the offense for which he 
was charged. Such a basis is explicitly prohibited by the plain language of the first 
sentence of Rule 404(b). I.R. 404(b) ("Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is 
not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that the person acted 
in conformity therewith."); see also State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 54 (2009) ("Evidence of 
uncharged misconduct may not be admitted pursuant to 1.R.E. 404(b) when its probative 
value is entirely dependent upon its tendency to demonstrate the defendant's propensity 
to engage in such behavior."). 
It is probably a matter of common sense that a parent's decision to abandon his 
or her rights to a child is, typically, considered to reflect negatively on the parent's 
character. See State v. Whitaker, 152 Idaho 945, 948 (Ct. App. 2012) (Rule 404(b) 
"prohibits evidence of conduct beyond criminal offenses if it is proffered for the purpose 
of showing a person's character and conforming behavior"). Regardless of whether it is 
common sense, Idaho has made it a felony to desert a child with the intent to abandon 
it. See I.C. § 18-401 (providing that a person is guilty of a felony if such person, 
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"[h]aving any child under the age of eighteen (18) years dependent upon him or her for 
care, education or support, deserts such child in any manner whatever, with intent to 
abandon it"). As such, evidence that Mr. Casad essentially abandoned his children after 
they were taken by the State was other acts evidence subject to exclusion under Rule 
404(b), unless an exception applied. 
Regardless of whether the district court erred in its stated basis for admitting 
evidence of Mr. Casad's disinterest in reuniting with his children, it would not have been 
relevant to show Mr. Casad's intent with respect to the crimes charged. Mr. Casad was 
not charged with being disinterested in his children after they were taken from him. The 
jury was tasked with deciding whether Mr. Casad "willfully caused or permitted" his 
children "to be placed in such a situation that" their "person[s] or health w[ere] 
endangered." (Tr., p.575, Ls.12-21 (emphasis added).) The Idaho Supreme Court has 
explained, "Evidence of uncharged misconduct must be relevant to a material and 
disputed issue concerning the crime charged, other than propensity." Grist, 147 Idaho 
at 52 (citation omitted). 
The district court erred when it concluded that the evidence did not require 
analysis under Rule 404(b) because it was res gestae. The Idaho Court of Appeals has 
provided a thorough description of the term res gestae and its applicability to other acts 
evidence, explaining, 
Res gestae is defined in part as: "The whole of the transaction under 
investigation and every part of it." The term is most often used in 
connection with Rule of Evidence 803(2), the "excited utterance" exception 
to the hearsay rule. It has been otherwise used, however, with reference 
to an exception to the general prohibition against use of other misconduct 
evidence. In this context, res gestae refers to other acts that occur during 
the commission of or in close temporal proximity to the charged offense 
which must be described to "complete the story of the crime on trial by 
placing it in the context of nearby and nearly contemporaneous 
happenings." McCormick suggests the use of the term "res gestae" in this 
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context is inappropriate and that the term "complete story principle" would 
be more appropriate. 
State v. Blackstead, 126 Idaho 14, 17-18 (Ct. App. 1994) (citations and footnote 
omitted). In explaining the limits of res gestae with respect to other acts evidence, the 
Court of Appeals explained that it "is an exception to the Rule 404(b) prohibition of other 
misconduct evidence only where the charged act and the uncharged act are so 
inseparably connected that the jury cannot be given a rational and complete 
presentation of the alleged crime without reference to the uncharged misconduct." Id. at 
19. Mr. Casad's case does not present these circumstances, especially in light of the 
fact that the crime with which he was charged was complete at the time his children 
were taken. As such, there was no need to present subsequent other acts evidence to 
provide "a rational and complete presentation of the alleged crime." 
Because the district court erred when it overruled Mr. Casad's objection to the 
State's request to present irrelevant, propensity evidence, the judgment of conviction 
must be vacated with the matter remanded for a new trial at which only properly 
admitted, relevant evidence is presented. 
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For the reasons 
CONCLUSION 
forth herein, Mr. Casad that the district court erred 
when, over his objection, it permitted the State to present irrelevant, propensity other 
acts evidence at trial. Because the error cannot be said to have been harmless beyond 
a reasonable doubt, he respectfully requests that this Court vacate the judgment of 
conviction and remand this matter for a new trial. 
DATED this 22nd day of September, 2014. 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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